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DE NOVO REVIEW: AN ALTERNATIVE TO STATE
AND FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION OF NON-
INDIAN MINOR CRIMES ON INDIAN LAND
Ted Wills*
L Introduction
In 1973, two non-Indians were arrested by Madison Reservation
tribal police during the Chief Seattle Days celebration. Those arrestees
later faced criminal charges in the Suquamish Indian Provisional Court.'
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court on certiorari in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe2 held that "Indian tribes do not have inherent
jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians." ' 3 Therefore, for minor
crimes such as recklessly endangering another person or injuring tribal
property, as in Oliphant,4 jurisdiction will fall to the state or federal
courts.' This note will show that the rule established in Oliphant -
denying tribal courts jurisdiction over non-Indian minor crimes - is
overbroad and should be replaced With a system of de novo review.
De novo review allows Indian courts to retain jurisdiction over minor
criminal offenses without denying constitutional protection to non-
Indian defendants. Additionally, at least in part, the historic pattern
of subordination of the American Indian race will be reversed.
II. American Indian Criminal Jurisdiction Generally
A. A Preeminent Role for Congress
The United States Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause provides
that Congress has the right to "regulate commerce... with the Indian
o 1992 Ted Wills
* J.D. 1992, Ohio State University College of Law; M.M., 1974, B.M., 1972,
Eastern School of Music, University of Rochester.
Third place award, 1990-91 American Indian Law Review writing competition.
1. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant v.
Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
2. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
3. Id. at 212.
4. Id. at 194.
5. State court jurisdiction of these minor crimes can be obtained through a special
vote by Indians provided for in 25 U.S.C. 9 1321(b) (1988). In the absence of the tribal
election in § 1321(b), federal courts will maintain their jurisdiction over all non-Indian
crimes. See generally Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Juris-
diction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. R-v. 535 (1975).
6. I have used the traditional terms "American Indian" and "Indian" to be
consistent with the majority of current literature. See generally ROBERT N. WLLAms,
THE AIm=ucAN INDtAN IN WESTmER LEoA. THOUoHT (1990); MoNRoB E. PRICE & ROBERT
N. CLrNToN, LAW AND nm As maicA INDmi (1983). See also the July-August 1986
issue of the American Indian Law Newsletter, and volume 14 of the American Indian
Law Review.
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tribes. '" 7 In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock," the United States Supreme Court
described the preeminent power of Congress in Indian matters in a
land cessation case involving the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes.
The Court held that Congress has "plenary authority" over tribal
relations not subject to control by the judicial department.9 This broad
rule has been eroded in modern cases which give at least a limited
role to the Court. 10 An example is Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,"
a case which involved a suit by an Indian against her own tribe in a
dispute over a tribal ordinance. The Supreme Court established a
modern balance of power when it held that Congress' authority over




With the dominant role held by Congress and increasing involvement
by the Court, the authority of the federal government over Indian
tribes has varied in manner from deferential to paternal. The defer-
ential approach is illustrated in United States v. Wheeler, 3 a collateral
estoppel case involving a tribal court criminal judgment and a subse-
quent federal district court indictment arising out of the same incident.
The Supreme Court held that "until Congress acts, the tribes retain
their existing sovereign powers."' 4 In other cases, however, the def-
erential attitude shifts to a more restrictive, prejudicial approach. The
Court in Oliphant5 defined tribal power negatively and more narrowly
when it held that Indian tribes "are prohibited from exercising both
those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by
Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with [Indian tribe] status.""16
B. Major and Minor Crimes
The legal authority of American Indian tribes described in Wheeler
often is referred to as "quasi sovereign.' 7 That concept is illustrated
in the area of tribal criminal jurisdiction on reservation land. For the
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
9. Id. at 565.
10. See generally Robert N. Clinton, State Power Over Indian Reservations: A
Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D. L. Rav. 434 (1981). The author
maintains that the Burger Court replaced established Supreme Court Indian doctrine
when it allowed increased state court jurisdiction over tribal matters.
II. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
12. Id. at 72.
13. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
14. Id. at 323.
15. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
16. Id. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976))
(emphasis supplied).
17. See generally id.; Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408, 425 (1989);
Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986).
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purposes of this note, jurisdiction can be divided into two categories:
major crimes and minor crimes. Within these two categories, there are
policies that grant jurisdiction depending on whether the alleged crim-
inal is Indian or non-Indian. Legislation by Congress and a series of
Supreme Court cases have defined the authority of tribal courts in
these areas.
For major crimes committed by Indians, Congress gave the federal
courts jurisdiction in the Indian Appropriations Act of 1885.18 The
amended version of the Act gives the federal courts jurisdiction over
crimes such as murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, rape, assault, arson,
burglary, robbery, and larceny when committed by Indians on reser-
vations.1 9 The Supreme Court declared this statute constitutional in
United States v. Kagama,0 where a member of the Hoopa Valley
Indian Reservation was accused of killing another Indian. 21 The Court
held that because of Indian "weakness and helplessness ... there
arises the duty of protection, and with it the power" for Congress to
give jurisdiction over major crimes to the federal courts.
22
In contrast, for major crimes committed by non-Indians against non-
Indians on Indian land, jurisdiction rests with state courts, not federal.
In United States v. McBratney,21 a non-Indian murdered another non-
Indian on a Utah reservation. The Court held that the state of Col-
orado had jurisdiction over its "own citizens and other white persons"
even with crimes committed on the Ute Reservation. 24 Therefore, the
tribe was denied jurisdiction and the accused was tried in the state
court.
25
For minor crimes committed on Indian land, jurisdiction also de-
pends on whether the alleged criminal is Indian or non-Indian. For
those crimes committed by Indians, tribal courts have jurisdiction over
the accused. The federal Crime and Criminal Procedure Act provides
that courts of the United States do not have jurisdiction over "any
offense in the Indian Country [which] has been punished by the local
18. Indians Appropriations Act, chs. 341, 362, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)). For a more complete discussion of the complexities of
criminal jurisdiction, see generally Paul S. Volk, Note, The Legal Trail of Tears:
Supreme Court Removal of Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Crimes by and Against
Reservation Indians, 20 NEw ENG. L. REv. 247, 250-54 (1985).
19. Id.
20. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 384.
23. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
24. Id. at 624. This case was followed in Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946),
where the Court stated that there is nothing that "requires a holding that offenses by
non-Indians against non-Indians [in] Salamanca [a city in Allegheny Reservation] are
beyond New York's power to punish." Id. at 501.
25. McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624.
No. 11
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law of the tribe." 26 For example, when a tribe member grazes her
sheep on land leased by another member, the tribe, not the federal
court, will have jurisdiction over the dispute.27 In addition, section
1321(b) of the Indian Civil Rights Act provides that states have criminal
jurisdiction over Indian crimes only with the "consent of the Indian
tribe occupying the particular Indian Country" in which the crime was
committed. 28 Therefore, with jurisdiction of major crimes in federal
and state courts - absent tribal consent to state court adjudication
- minor crimes by Indians default to tribal jurisdiction.
Minor crimes by non-Indians, however, are not within tribal juris-
diction. In Oliphant, the United States Supreme Court heard the case
of a non-Indian charged with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting
arrest.29 The issue for the Court was whether Indian tribal courts had
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians? 0 The Court held that they do
not.31
The majority in Oliphant, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist,
cited three justifications for denying tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian
crimes: implied congressional intent, the Treaty of Point Elliot, and
the Court's view that jurisdiction was inconsistent with the status of
Indian tribes. On the issue of intent, the Court acknowledged that
Congress never expressly forbade Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians; 2 rather, Congress "expressly confirmed" that un-
spoken assumption in House and Senate committee reports.3" By way
of illustration, the Court cited the unpassed Western Territory Bill in
which Congress attempted to establish United States laws and protec-
tion for persons traveling through and residing in Indian Country. In
that bill, Congress' concern was that there were no "fixed laws" or
"competent tribunals of justice" that would provide peace in Indian
Country without United States protection.34 The Court also noted a
1960 Senate report concerning trespasses by non-Indians on Indian
land. That report asserted that state law was needed to prosecute non-
Indian trespassers on Indian land because "Indian tribal law is en-
forceable against Indians only; not against non-Indians. ' 35
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
27. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1988).
29. Oliphant 435 U.S. at 194.
30. Id. at 195.
3. Id.
32. Id. at 204.
33. Id. at 204-05.
34. H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1834). The Western Territory Bill
was submitted to Congress several times but was never passed. See Oliphant, 435 U.S.
at 202 n.13.




The Court in Oliphant also cited the Treaty of Point Elliot 6 as
evidence that Congress did not intend for Indians to have jurisdiction
over minor crimes committed by non-Indians on Indian land.3 7 In the
original draft of the treaty was a clause providing that "[finjuries
committed by whites towards [Indians] [are] ... to be tried by the
Laws of the United States." 38 However, that clause was deleted in the
final text. The Court stated, nonetheless, that the provision in which
the Indians promised to be "friendly" with all United States citizens,
"could well have been understood as acknowledging exclusive federal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians." 3 9
The Court's final justification was that tribal jurisdiction was 'in-
consistent with their status."''0 As evidence of the Indians' subordinate
status, the Court noted that tribes were under the territorial sovereignty
of the United States and had lost the power to sell their property to
foreign nations.41 Therefore, the Indian tribes had given up their power
to try non-Indian citizens of the United States. According to the
majority, a principle obvious a century ago "should be no less obvious
today."
,42
IfL The Competing Forces of Indian Jurisdiction
of Non-Indian Minor Crimes on Indian Land
A. Indian Subordination
The conquest and subsequent subordination of American Indians,
the uneven development of the tribal judicial system, and problems of
non-Indian crime on reservations are three competing forces that shape
the issue of tribal courts' criminal jurisdiction. The first of these forces
is the historic racial subordination and the peculiar legal status of
American Indian tribes. The Supreme Court speaks of the Indian tribes
as "distinct independent political communities ' 4 and "quasi sover-
eigns." 44 However, this elevated language fails to accurately charac-
terize the American Indian-United States relationship. An attitude of
dominance and superiority marks much of the United States' associ-
ations with the Indian tribes. Moreover, that prejudice has reached
the force of law in Supreme Court decisions in Indian cases.
36. Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, U.S.-Dwamish et al., 12 Stat. 927 (1855).
37. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 207.
38. Id. at 207 n.16.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976))
(emphasis supplied).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 210.
43. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
44. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
No. 1]
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The principal Indian doctrine of the United States was outlined in
a trilogy of early nineteenth-century cases written by Justice Marshall.
In the first of these, Johnson v. McIntosh,45 a case that denied the
right of Indian tribes to sell their tribal lands to foreign nations,
Marshall articulated the doctrine of discovery and conquest. Noting
that most European nations approved of the discovery doctrine, Mar-
shall held that ultimate title to United States territory was acquired by
conquest subject only to the "Indian title of occupancy. '46 Conse-
quently, as a colonial power the United States, not Indian tribes, had
the exclusive right as the discoverer to transfer title to reservation
lands.4 7
Not only did the conquerors have exclusive power by discovery but
the only limit to that control was self-imposed. 48 In order to ensure
that the conquering nation would exercise self-control, Marshall held
that Indians should not be "wantonly oppressed." 49 An example of
the Supreme Court's attempt to avoid oppressing the conquered tribes
was in Worcester v. Georgia."' In this case, Marshall spoke of the
quasi-sovereignty of Indian tribes, a notion that tribes retained their
"original natural rights, as undisputed possessors of the soil. ' 5 There-
fore, the state of Georgia had no authority to prevent missionaries
from entering Cherokee land because only the federal government, not
the state, could limit the rights of the tribe. The result of Worcester
is that tribes have the power of sovereigns free of state control subject
only to the federal government.
The final concept of the Marshall trilogy is the resulting guardian-
ward relationship between the United States and the American Indian.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,52 where the state of Georgia enacted
statutes nullifying all laws, ordinances, and regulations of the Cherokee
tribe, Marshall again spoke for the Supreme Court. The Court held
that since the tribes "look to our government for protection; rely upon
its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and
address the president as their great father," the relationship of the
federal government to the Indians was that of a "ward to his guard-
ian. ' 53 This role of steward created a "trust relationship"5 4 with the
federal government as the conqueror and subsequent protector of the
Indian tribes.
45. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 583 (1823).
46. Id. at 592.
47. Id. at 584.
4:. Id. at 589.
49. Id.
50. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
51. Id.
52. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
53. Id. at 17.
54. See generally Piuca & CLINTON, supra note 6, at 168-69.
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The Marshall trilogy set the foundation for United States-American
Indian relations, and the policy of quasi-sovereignty has survived in
the most recent Supreme Court cases." That policy has led at least
one commentator to contend that, on the issue of tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, "friacism is not present here - Indian tribes are
political, not race-based, entities." 56 Indeed, in the abstract, the Su-
preme Court can be viewed as a judicial "great father" protecting the
wants of its ward. The Marshall theories, however, cannot be under-
stood fully without looking at the attitudes of the conquering country
toward the race of the conquered tribes.
Examples of racial categorization coupled with manipulative and
heavy-handed control fill the writings of the early nineteenth century.
For example, in 1803 President Jefferson, one of the great fathers of
the United States, detailed a plan to acquire land from American
Indians. In order to quickly purchase territory for white expansion,
the government was to set up trading houses to sell goods to Indians. 7
Jefferson noted that "influential individuals among [the Indians] run
in debt, [and] we observe that when the debts get beyond what the
individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession
of lands." 8 Jefferson acknowledged that this would eventually lead
to the termination of the Indians' history, but "they must see we have
only to shut our hand to crush them, and that all our liberalities to
them proceed from motives of pure humanity only."5 9
In 1848, William Medill, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, expressed
an even more conscious attitude of supremacy when he compared
Indians to the white "superior race." 6 He reported that Indians were
inveterately wedded to "savage habits."' 6' Moreover, it was Medill's
opinion that, except in rare instances, an Indian could be brought no
"farther within the pale of civilization than to adopt its vices[,] under
the corrupting influences of which, too indolent to labor, and too
weak to resist, he soon sinks into misery and despair." ' 62
In the late nineteenth century, white superiority and Indian subor-
dination were still official public policy. In 1883, Secretary of the
55. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
56. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERCAN INDIANS, Tm AND Tm LAW 112 (1987).
The author, former staff attorney for the Native American Rights Fund, presents an
insightful and progressive analysis of American Indians in the United States constitutional
system.
57. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to William Henry Harrison (Feb. 27,
1803), in DocUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 22 (Francis P. Prucha ed.,
1990).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 23.
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Interior Henry Teller spoke of the "savage rites and heathenish cus-
toms" of the tribes. 63 The Secretary condemned the Indians' sun dance,
scalp dance, marriage laws, medicine men, and tribal burial rites. 64 His
recommendations for abolition of the Indian practices subsequently
became law when Congress created the Court of Indian Offenses. 65
Not only was Indian culture denigrated, but Indians were not allowed
to vote. In Elk v. Wilkins,66 the Supreme Court denied an Indian who
had disassociated himself from his tribe the right to vote in federal
elections. The Court noted that the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed
suffrage should not be denied "on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." 67 However, the Court did not enfranchise
John Elk because he had not in any way been "recognized or treated
as a citizen" for the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment.
68
To see the doctrine of discovery and the corollary principle of semi-
sovereign status for Indian tribes absent a historic context is to miss
the reality of United States' subordination of its native people. Indeed,
the abstract principles of conquest and dependent nation status preserve
in United States law "the legacy of 1,000 years of European racism
and colonialism directed against non-Western peoples." ' 69 Despite Mar-
shall's vision for the American Indian, it was the Supreme Court in
1901 that spoke most realistically of the sovereignty of Indian tribes.
Justice Brown held that "the word 'nation' as applied to the uncivilized
Indians is so much of a misnomer as to be little more than a compli-
ment."
70
B. An Undeveloped Indian Criminal Justice System
Another of the competing forces in determining American Indian
criminal jurisdiction is the wide variation in quality of tribal courts.
As the Court in Oliphant noted, there is a dearth of settled Indian
law and competent courts.7' Indeed, tribal courts vary from dispute
resolvers enforcing "unwritten tribal rules and customs" to modern
tribal courts governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act72 and federal
regulations concerning the appointment and qualifications of tribal
court judges. The Court acknowledged that "some Indian tribal court
63. Id. at 160.
64. Id. at 160-61.
65. See generally VILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDOES (1966).
66. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
67. U.S CONST. amend. XV.
68. Elk, 112 U.S. at 99. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-
1973bb-2 (1988), gave the right of suffrage to Indians.
69. WmLIAms, supra note 6, at 317.
70. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (1901).
71. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 202 (1978).
72. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988).
73. Volk, supra note 18, at 256.
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systems have become increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many
respects their state counterparts." 7 4 However, even with these improve-
ments the most sympathetic writers admit that some Indian courts
administer little more that rural justice.75
The undeveloped nature of many Indian courts has been noted by
commentators on the American Indian tribal judiciary. For example,
Indian judges are often held in relatively low status, and very few
have legal training.7 6 In most cases, tribal appellate systems are gen-
erally poor; in some courts, no appeal is available.7 7 Further, a recent
survey of attorneys in states with large Indian populations found that
a majority of attorneys had a low opinion of tribal courtsY.
7
In 1967, a Senate subcommittee reached a similar conclusion in a
report submitted to the Congressional Record. The subcommittee cited
a survey of 2000 questionnaires given to a broadly representative group
of persons familiar with Indian affairs. The questions dealt with the
lack of constitutional protections for defendants in tribal courts. 79 The
results of the investigation showed that substantive and political rights
were denied "not from malice or ill will ... but from the tribal
judges' inexperience, lack of training, and unfamiliarity with the tra-
ditions and forms of the American legal system." 80
In contrast to some Indian courts that may offer little more than
self-help solutions to disputes,8' other Indian tribes have highly devel-
oped legal systems. Perhaps the most notable is the Navajo Nation.
The Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation is organized at the trial
level into five family courts and seven district courts with three circuit
judges. All of these courts have the right of appeal to a three-member
Navajo Supreme Court.12 In the 1990 fiscal year, the district courts
handled 43,422 civil cases, 39,872 criminal cases, 245 juvenile probation
74. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12.
75. Gordon K. Wright, Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37
STAN. L. Rv. 1397, 1401 (1985).
76. Id. at 1407.
77. Id.
78. Jesse C. Trentadue, Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Collection Suits by Local
Merchants and Lenders: An Obstacle to Credit for Reservation Indians?, 13 Ai. INDIAN
L. Rav. 1, 47 (1985).
79. 113 CONG. REC. 13,473 (1967).
80. Id.
81. See generally Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d
682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981). Dry Creek was a land access
dispute between the owner of a hunting lodge and the Arapahoe and Shoshone Indians.
The Tribal Council advised the Indians to shut down the hunting lodge. The Court of
Appeals held that self-help was not a legitimate method of determining constitutional
questions.
82. JuICIAL BRANCH OF Ta NAvAJo NATION, ANN A REPORT: OCTOBER 1989-
MARCH 1990 (1990) (organizational chart).
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cases, 899 family court cases, and a total of 721 children cases.83 The
actual expenditures of the Navajo judiciary for the 1990 fiscal year
were over $700,000. The expenses varied from salaries to office sup-
plies, jury and witness fees, and education and training programs.84
The policies that control the Navajo justice system are at once
historical and progressive. As stated by Chief Justice Tom Tso, "We
have confronted different peoples and ways, and have endured by
adapting the new in such a way that it becomes Navajo." 85 Evidence
of the dynamic and powerful role of the Navajo judiciary is the recent
decision by the Navajo Tribal Council to grant the Navajo Supreme
Court full authority to rule on the legitimacy of Navajo legislative and
executive acts.86 Judicial review was the final result of an eleven-year
struggle between the branches of the Navajo tribe. The Council decided
that if the Navajo Nation "is to move forward toward the reality of
a three-branch form of government[,] the Navajo Supreme Court must
be the final law on Indian land."
817
C. Non-Indian Minor Crime on Indian Land
The competing forces of constitutional theory and the irregular
development of Indian tribal judicial systems must also be viewed in
the context of minor crimes on Indian land. The Court in Oliphant
noted the "prevalence of non-Indian crime on today's reservations." S
Similarly, the problem of non-Indian crime has been noted in con-
gressional testimony, court opinions, and newspaper accounts, and is
illustrated by the facts of Oliphant itself.
In congressional hearings on reform of the Federal Criminal Laws,
Colville and Makah Indian tribal representatives from the state of
Washington testified concerning the problem on non-Indian crime. The
Indians spoke of "the willful disobedience of tribal hunting and fishing
laws," 9 and noted that "speeding, reckless driving, and automobile
accidents [were] increasing at an alarming rate." 9 The chairman of
the Makah Tribe testified that law enforcement had ceased on the
reservation because the county sheriff was based seventy miles from
83. Id. at 6-8.
84. Id. at 36.
85. Tom Ts6, The Tribal Court Survives in America, 25 JUDoEs' J. 22, 55 (1986).
85. Judicial Reform Act of 1985, Navajo Tribal Council Resolution CD-94-85 (Dec.
4, 1985) (codified at NAvAJo TRiu. CODE tit. 7 (Supp. 1984-1985); Tom Tso, Decision
Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 225, 231 (1989).
87. Judicial Reform Act of 1985, Navajo Tribal Council Resolution CD-94-85 (Dec.
4, 1985) (codified at NAvAJo TRai. CODE tit. 7, at 104 (Supp. 1984-1985)) (note in
subchapter 6).
83. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
89. Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1400 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5888, 5890
(1973).
91). Id. at 5898.
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the reservation and did not have sufficient means to enforce the law
on Indian land.9'
Courts familiar with the problems of non-Indian crime on reserva-
tions also note the difficulties of enforcing Indian law. For example,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Oliphant v. Schlie92 observed
that federal enforcement is difficult because "prosecutors are reluctant
to institute federal proceedings against non-Indians for minor offen-
ses." 93 The federal prosecutors' hesitation is attributed to crowded
dockets, the long distances that witnesses and officers must travel, and
cases that likely will result in a small fines or suspended sentences.
9 4
In a newspaper interview, the United States Attorney of Butte, Mon-
tana, agreed with that opinion. He said that denying tribal jurisdiction
created a "vacuum" of law enforcement on the reservation because
neither the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor his office could handle
the caseload of non-Indian crimes committed on Indian reservations. 96
The facts of Oliphant are an additional illustration of the problem
of non-Indian crime on tribal land. In August 1973, on the Madison
Indian Reservation, thousands of people were expected for the Chief
Seattle Days celebration. To control the expected influx, tribal au-
thorities requested law enforcement assistance from the local county
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).9 For the entire weekend, the
county provided one deputy for eight hours of service.98 The BIA
declined all help and responded that the Indians "would have to
provide their own law enforcement out of tribal funds and with tribal
personnel." 99 Subsequently, tribal police arrested Oliphant at 4:30 a.m.
on August 19 and later charged him with "assaulting a tribal officer
and resisting arrest. ' ' l°° The same night, Belgarde, after a high-speed
race that ended only when he collided with a tribal police vehicle, was
arrested and charged with tribal criminal violations.' 0'
The dilemma of tribes with no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian
minor crimes is summarized in the Ninth Circuit decision, which was
overturned by the Supreme Court in Oliphant. The Ninth Circuit noted
91. Id.
92. 544 F.2d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 1976).
93. Volk, supra note 18, at 274 n.221 (quoting Steven M. Johnson, Jurisdiction:
Criminal Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems on Indian Reservations in the Wake
of Oliphant, 7 Am. IND.N L. R-v. 291, 293 (1978)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 296.
96. Id. (quoting the BLINcs GAzETrTE (Billings, Mont.), Mar. 7, 1978, at 8A).
97. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1976).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).
101. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing tribal Code).
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that federal law is not designed to cover minor offenses.'02 Further-
more, local courts are reluctant to prosecute non-Indians for minor
offenses 03 because of difficulties with state process on reservations,
unclear jurisdictional divisions, and the fact that the crimes do not
affect the non-Indians' society but that of the Indian tribe.'14 As a
result, the "dignity of the tribal government suffers in the eyes of
Indian and non-Indian alike, and a tendency toward lawless behavior
necessarily follows."' 10 5
IV. De Novo Review Balances the Competing Forces in Criminal
Jurisdiction of Non-Indians on Indian Land
A. De Novo Review - Generally
IEe novo review has been defined as "[t]rying a matter anew; the
same as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision had
been previously rendered."'' 0 In England, new trials were granted as
part of the common law as early as 1665.107 Since then, courts have
used new trials "as a measure of correcting the mistakes and relieving
against the misconduct of juries." 103 In the United States, de novo
review was found constitutional in Ludwig v. Massachusetts. 10 The
Supreme Court held that it is not unconstitutional for a state to give
"a defendant two opportunities to avoid conviction and secure an
acquittal." 10
B. De Novo Review Applied in Other Systems
1. Arbitration with De Novo Review
Compulsory arbitration with an option for de novo review has been
used as an alternative form of dispute resolution. The success of some
of these systems point to the advantage of de novo review as a collateral
check on forums outside the state and federal judicial system. In the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
a compulsory system of arbitration for civil money damage disputes
under $50,000 handled 4010 cases from February 1, 1978, through
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June 30, 1982."' Either party had the option of requesting de novo
review in the federal district court. However, during those fifty-three
months, only sixty of the 4010 cases required a court trial." 2
A similar result was found in Cincinnati, where a local court rule
directs that all cases in which the amount in controversy is less than
$10,000 be referred to a panel for compulsory arbitration.""' The
litigants have the option of a de novo review if dissatisfied with the
results. However, in 85% of the cases, the arbitration decision was
accepted and the case was never tried." 4 Even though only 1.5% to
15% of the cases in these two systems required a formal trial, de novo
review allowed a complete alternative to a dissatisfied defendant. If
either party "demands a trial de novo ... the case is treated as if it
had not been arbitrated.""1
5
2. Municipal Two-Tier Systems
The two-tier bench court system which was declared constitutional
in Ludwig is another practical application of de novo review. In
Massachusetts, a system of municipal courts have original jurisdiction
of criminal offenses with potential sentences of not more than five
years. 16 As with compulsory nonbinding arbitration, if the defendant
is dissatisfied with the outcome of the first proceeding, he can invoke
his constitutional right to a jury trial by "appealing" for a trial de
novo." 7 The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Lyden v. Common-
wealth,"' noted with approval a study of the system showing that in
a six-month period over 1751 complaints were received and only 158,
or about 9%, were tried before a jury."19 Moreover, although infre-
quently used, the state court system provided full constitutional pro-
tection with no prejudice to either party. At the same time, the
municipal court was allowed to deal directly and efficiently with local
crime.
C. De Novo Review Helps Reverse the Historic
Subordination of the American Indian Tribes
In McIntosh, Worcester, and Cherokee Nation, Justice Marshall
established the doctrines of discovery and quasi-sovereignty. 20 The
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history of subordination toward the American Indian, however, is
inextricably mixed with these principles. Allowing tribal court juris-
dicl|ion with de novo review for minor crimes on Indian land would,
in part, reverse the history of subordination of American Indians. At
the same time, there would be no compromise of United States con-
stitutional protection and no additional burden on tribes that do not
choose to assert jurisdiction over non-Indian minor crime. As noted
by the Ninth Circuit in Oliphant,121 without tribal control of non-
Indian minor crimes, traffic offenses, trespasses, hunting and fishing
violations, larcenies, and simple assaults often go unpunished. If Indian
justice systems have the power to prosecute these offenses, the only
limit on the prosecutors and courts will be the tribe's political and
judicial resources.
A. corollary to allowing de novo review is that tribes will not be
required to prosecute non-Indian minor crimes if they do not so choose
to do so. Some tribes are concerned that de novo review would "impose
unmanageable financial burdens on tribal governments. 1 2 2 However,
with de novo review Indian tribes would be able to deal with this
problem in the way that is best suited to their needs and resources.
Tribes could consent to state jurisdiction pursuant to section 1321(b)
of the Indian Civil Rights Act '2 and be free of all responsibility for
non-Indian crime. Alternatively, the tribes could assume jurisdiction
and seek to control minor crimes on Indian land subject to a second
trial in state or federal court.
Because a non-Indian defendant will have the right to a second trial
in a state or federal court with no prejudice to either party, 24 the
protections of the federal constitution will not be sacrificed. As sug-
gested by Senator Ervin, the second trial would determine if "the
appellant was deprived of any right or privilege conferred on him by
the Constitution." 12 In addition to that protection, a non-Indian would
have the opportunity in every case to have his guilt determined by the
courts and the laws of the United States.
If we believe that justice cannot be served on minor crimes in
American Indian courts with a system of de novo review, we are
irrationally continuing the historic subordination and racial categori-
zation of Indian tribes. With de novo review, Indian tribes can be
given the opportunity to deal directly and efficiently with minor crime
on Indian land, and non-Indian defendants will receive all the protec-
tions of federal and state constitutions.
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D. De Novo Review: A Solution to Undeveloped
Tribal Justice Systems
The problems often noted with the Indian justice systems, such as
disregard for written court rules and tribal politics influencing judicial
decisions, 26 may at least partially be alleviated by a system of de novo
review. The curative effect of de novo review was noted by the Supreme
Court in Ludwig. It reasoned that it is possible for the first proceeding
to be unfair. However, the defendant may protect himself by insisting
on a new trial. 27 In a similar proposal for de novo review made during
hearings concerning Legislation to Protect the Constitutional Rights
of the American Indian, 28 Senator Ervin noted during hearings that
a new trial would be in the same manner and under the same rules as
if the criminal action had been in the United States district court.
1 29
As a consequence, the non-Indian defendant would receive all the
protections offered by the state or federal constitutions.
Even though the defendant would be protected by state and federal
constitutions, Indian courts would be allowed either to retain their
tribal form of justice or adapt to more rigorous judicial standards. In
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, the court discussed the indirect effect of a
second jury trial on the initial proceeding. Justice Blackmun stated
that "the right to a [new] jury trial very likely serves its intended
purpose of making judicial or prosecutorial unfairness less likely."' 3
This ancillary effect of de novo review was noted by Senator Ervin,
who claimed that "[s]uch an appeal would not only protect the rights
of those convicted by tribal courts, but would improve the quality of
justice rendered by tribal courts."''
E. Decreased Problems of Non-Indian Minor Crimes
In addition to encouraging improvements in tribal courts, de novo
review will help relieve the unmanageable burdens placed on federal
or state authorities in controlling non-Indian minor crime on Indian
land. For example, if a non-Indian defendant is tried in a tribal court,
the possibility of a new trial at the state or federal level may be
unnecessary or unattractive. If the accused is found not guilty, the
issue will be closed and there will be no need for a federal or state
proceeding. In the alternative, if the defendant is convicted, the pos-
sibility of a new trial may be an unattractive option for two reasons.
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First, if the crime is relatively minor, the penalty light, and the evidence
against the defendant strong, he may decide to forego the second trial
rather than risk an additional prosecution and a fairly certain second
conviction. In a situation involving a more serious offense, a defendant
may also choose to avoid state or federal court because of the possi-
bility of a harsher sentence. 32 The combination of these checks on the
use of a de novo trial will relieve the overburdened state and federal
criminal systems.'33
De novo review is more economical for state and federal systems,
and will help answer the Indians' concerns with minor crimes on
reservation land. Tribes such as the Navajo, the Red Lake of Min-
nesota, Warm Springs of Oregon, Menominees of Wisconsin, and the
Medlakatlas of Alaska, which have "legal systems and organizations
'functioning in a reasonably satisfactory manner,"' 4 may chose to
assume responsibility for non-Indian crime. With jurisdiction over
minor non-Indian crimes, tribes can enforce laws with their own police
and judicial systems. This tribal control will give Indians the oppor-
tunity to prosecute minor crimes as efficiently as their systems will
allow.
V. Conclusion
By denying Indian tribes the power to try and to punish non-Indian
minor crimes, the Supreme Court has further restricted the Indians'
"quasi-sovereign" authority over their own land. The Court reasoned
that minor crime jurisdiction was "inconsistent with their status." The
result is the abuse of vehicle, hunting, and other tribal laws. Even
though many tribes are ill-equipped to handle criminal prosecution, a
system of de novo review would encourage Indians to develop more
sophsticated judicial structures without denying non-Indian defendants
any of the protections of the federal and state courts. Consequently,
the historic subordination of the Indian race would, to a certain extent,
be reversed. In addition, the more efficient Indian police forces would
then have the opportunity to better control non-Indian minor crime
on reservation land.
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